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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION
THROUGH PUBLIC PARKS - JUDICIAL REVIEW
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1970).
Petitioners sought an injunction in a federal district court to pre-
vent the Secretary of Transportation from releasing federal funds
for a segment of an interstate highway which would pass through
a city park in Memphis, Tennessee.' The district court granted re-
spondents' motion for summary judgment after considering affidavits
and arguments from both parties. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed.2 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme
Court, and in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,3
the Court found that the Secretary of Transportation's decision was
subject to judicial review, but reversed and remanded the case to
the district court because the litigation affidavits upon which the
lower court based its decision did not constitute the whole record
and were an inadequate basis for judicial review.
Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, initially dealt with
the judiciary's authority to review the Secretary's decision. The
Court found authority to review based on section 701 of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA).' This Act allows judicial review
except where "statutes preclude judicial review" or "agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law."5  The Court found no
statutory prohibition6 and stated that there was no agency action
"committed to agency discretion" because there were applicable legal
standards to be followed by the Secretary in making his decision.
These standards are found in section 4(f) of the Department of
1 The district court found that petitioners had standing to maintain this suit because
of their active involvement in the administrative proceedings to select a path and de-
sign for the expressway. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp.
1189, 1191 (W.D. Tenn.), afl'd, 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 402
(1971).
2 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970),
rev'd, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
3 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
4 5 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. V, 1970).
5Id. §§ 701(a) (1), (2).
6 The Court has held that "silence" by Congress does not infer nonreviewability
but rather will raise a presumption of reviewability unless there is "clear and convincing
evidence" to the contrary. Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962). See Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S.
180 (1956). See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
336-63 (1965).
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Transportation Act of 19667 and section 18(a) of the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1968,8 each of which specifies that the Secretary
"shall not approve any program or project" where public parklands
are used "unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to
the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible
planning to minimize harm to such park ... " The Court inter-
preted these statutory provisions to be an explicit bar to the use of
federal funds for the construction of highways through parks unless
alternative- routes present unique problems.
The Court next turned to the issue of what standards should have
been applied by the district court in reviewing the Secretary's deci-
sion. It properly rejected the petitioner's argument that the standard
to be applied by the district court should be that the agency action
must be set aside if not supported by "substantial evidence"9 or,
alternatively, that the court is to engage in a de novo review of the
action and set it aside if "unwarranted by the facts."' 10 But it did de-
cide that the generally applicable standards of section 706 of the
APA" required that the reviewing court engage in a substantial in-
quiry into the Secretary's decision, more so than had been done by
the district court. By substantial inquiry the Court meant an exami-
nation of (1) whether the Secretary acted within his scope of au-
thority,12 (2) whether the decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,""i and
(3) whether the necessary procedural requirements were followed.,4
The Court observed that the only procedural error alleged in this
case was the Secretary's failure to make any formal findings in sup-
port of his decision. But despite the Court's substantial inquiry di-
rective to the district court, which would be facilitated by the avail-
ability of formal findings, it ruled that formal findings were not re-
quired in this instance because of a lack of any statutory require-
749 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (Supp. V, 1970).
823 U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. V, 1970).
9 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (Supp. V, 1970). The Court held that this standard is ap-
plicable only when the agency action is subject to a public adjudicatory hearing. See
5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (Supp. V, 1970). The hearing in this case was nonadjudicatory.
10 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (Supp. V, 1970). The Court stated that de novo review is
only "authorized when the action is adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding
procedures are inadequate" or "when issues that were not before the agency are raised
in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action." 401 U.S. at 415.
115 U.S.C. § 706(2) (Supp. V, 1970).
121d. § 706(2)(C).
131d. § 706(2)(A).
14Id. § 706(2)(D).
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ments therefor and the existence of an administrative record from
which a full, prompt review could be made. The Court emphasized,
nevertheless, that on remand the district court's review must be based
on the full administrative record available to the Secretary at the
time of his decision. And the Court stated that because the bare
record might not disclose the factors considered by the Secretary,
or his construction of the evidence, the district court might find it
necessary to call administrative officials who participated in the de-
cision to give testimony concerning the reasons behind their actions.
Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, filed a separate
opinion. He agreed that the court of appeals decision should be re-
versed, but stated that the case should be remanded to the Secretary
of Transportation rather than to the district court. Mr. Justice Black
determined that in order to comply with the standards set up in sec-
tion 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and
section 18 (a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, the Secretary
was required to hold hearings that would provide a factual basis
for his decision and for later court review. Because the Secretary
failed to comply with these requirements, Mr. Justice Black felt the
case should be remanded directly to the Secretary, who should give
the matter a full hearing.
The Supreme Court's decision in Overton Park typifies the trend
in recent federal court cases15 to review more administrative decisions
by liberalizing the concept of standing to include conservational as
well as economic interests. "' Of further significance is the Court's
interpretation of the language of section 4(f) of the Department
of Transportation Act of 1966 and section 18(a) of the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1968 to be an explicit bar to the use of federal
funds to build highways through parks except in unusual situations. 7
Because of this interpretation, conservationists will no longer have
the burden of showing that the decision of the Secretary, after
balancing the conservation of the parkland against such other fac-
tors as cost, safety, and community disruption resulting from the use
15See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). But see Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. granted sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton, 401 U.S. 907 (1971).
16 See note 1 supra. The Supreme Court recognized this fact in Association of Data
Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1971), where it stated in
dictum that a plaintiff's interest "may reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational'
as well as economic values." Id. at 154.
17 See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
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of an alternative route, was plainly wrong or arbitrary.' Rather, in
order to overcome the plaintiff's charge that his decision was arbi-
trary, the Secretary will have to show that he gave paramount im-
portance to the protection of the parkland, but that nevertheless,
other factors presented such unique problems that an alternate route
was not justified.
The major significance of this decision may ultimately be the
Court's failure to discuss the issue of sovereign immunity. Sovereign
immunity is the right of the government to be free from suit when
it or its agents act in a governmental capacity, unless it consents to
the suit. In Overton, the Court granted the plaintiffs a stay pend-
ing appeal that halted construction of the highway."9 This decision
carries the inference that the Court no longer views sovereign im-
munity as an absolute defense 20 Discussion of this issue, however,
is -beyond the scope of this comment. But hopefully the Supreme
Court will soon act to remove some of the confusion in the sover-
eign immunity area created by its decision in Overton.
's For example, in Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
the plaintiffs sought to review and to have set aside a determination by the Federal High-
way Administrator to build part of an interstate highway through a wild life sanctuary.
This decision was made before the effective date of the Department of Transportation
Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651-59 (Supp. V, 1970). The district court referred to the
new Act to support its determination that the Administrator's decision was subject to
judicial review, but it allowed the decision to stand because the route through the sanc-
tuary was not, upon consideration of such other factors as conservation, so "plainly
wrong" that it should be set aside. The court did not feel that the conservation factor
or any other factor was of paramount importance, but rather thought the ultimate ques-
tion was "whether the overall decision, reviewed in the light of all the competing factors,
was arbitrary." 270 F. Supp. at 663.
19 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 400 U.S. 939 (1970); see 401 U.S.
at 406. The Court treated the plaintiff's application for a stay as a petition for a writ of
certiorari.
2 0 The Court did not mention the landmark case of Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1948), in which a private corporation sought an in-
junction prohibiting a government administrator from selling certain surplus coal which
the corporation claimed it had purchased. The Court held that in a suit against the
United States, the district court was without jurisdiction unless the government con-
sented to being sued. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Malone v. Bowdoin,
369 U.S. 643 (1962). See also D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, LITIGATION WITH THE
FEDERAL GovERNMENT 267-301 (1970).
In a case decided since Overton Park, United States ex rel. Sierra Club v. Hickel,
No. C70-971 (N.D. Ohio 1971), the plaintiffs sought to void a land exchange be-
tween two utility companies and the Department of the Interior. The utility com-
panies wanted the land as a site for a nuclear power plant, but the plaintiffs objected be-
cause the land was an important stop-over for migratory waterfowl. The district court
cited Overton Park, but not for the proposition that sovereign immunity is no longer an
absolute defense. Rather, the court dismissed the plaintiff's action under the traditional
rule set forth in Larson.
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